Fair Representation in the European Parliament by Balinski, M.L. & Young, H.P.
Fair Representation in the 
European Parliament
Balinski, M.L. and Young, H.P.
IIASA Working Paper
 
July 1981
Balinski, M.L. and Young, H.P. (1981) Fair Representation in the European Parliament. IIASA Working Paper. Copyright © 
1981 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/1665/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
FAIR REPRESENTATION 
I N  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
M.L. B a l i n s k i  and H.P. Young 
J u l y  1981 
WP-81-96 
Working Papere a r e  i n t e r i m  r e p o r t s  on work of  t h e  . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Applied Systems Analys i s  
and have r ece ived  on ly  l i m i t e d  review. V i e w s  o r  
op in ions  expressed  h e r e i n  do n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  repre-  
s e n t  t h o s e  of  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o r  of  i t s  Nat iona l  Member 
Organ iza t ions .  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, A u s t r i a  
THE ATJTHORS 
M.L. Balinski, Tnstitut Auguste Comte, Paris, France 
H.P. Young, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria 
ABSTRACT 
The number of seats currently apportioned to each nation 
in the European Parliament is far from the ideal of one-man, 
one-vote. It is likely to become even more so as populations 
shift and new nations join. 
As European rather than national interests become more 
dominant pressure is likely to build for representation more 
closely tied to populations. The merits of different approaches 
to meeting fair representation are evaluated and compared in 
terms of basic principles that underlie one-man, one-vote. 
F A I R  REPRESENTATION 
I N  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
M.L. B a l i n s k i  and H.P. Young 
1 .  REPRESENTATION 
The 4 3 4  s e a t s  of t h e  European Par l iament  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  ap- 
por t ioned  among t h e  t e n  member n a t i o n s  a s  fo l lows:  81 t o  each 
of t h e  Fede ra l  Republ ic  of Germany, t h e  United Kingdom, I t a l y ,  
and France;  25 t o  t h e  Nether lands;  2 4  t o  each of Belgium and 
Greece; 1 6  t o  Denmark; 15 t o  I r e l a n d ;  and 6  t o  Luxembourg. Why 
were t h e s e  members chosen? 
Throughout t h e  b u i l d i n g  of t h e  European Community t h e  numbers 
of d e l e g a t e s  a l l o t t e d  t o  each of t h e  member s t a t e s  have been t h e  
r e s u l t  of p o l i t i c a l  n e g o t i a t i o n  and compromise. Delega t ions  were 
thought  of a s  b l o c s  s t a n d i n g  t o g e t h e r  t o  r e p r e s e n t  n a t i o n a l  in-  
t e r e s t s .  This  view s t i l l  p r e v a i l e d  when, i n  1976, t h e  d e c i s i o n  
was made t o  expand t h e  Assembly from 198 t o  4 1 0  members e l e c t e d  
by d i r e c t  u n i v e r s a l  s u f f r a g e .  This  d e c i s i o n  has  had profound 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  ve ry  n a t u r e  of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  P a r l i a -  
ment. 
How many s e a t s  t o  g i v e  each n a t i o n  i n  t h e  reformed Assembly 
was a  h o t l y  c o n t e s t e d  i s s u e .  A r e s o l u t i o n  adopted by t h e  Assembly 
i n  1975 enunc ia ted  t h r e e  c r i t e r i a  t o  govern t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of 
s e a t s . '  The f i r s t  and most s i g n i f i c a n t  of  t h e s e  i s  a widely 
shared  concept  of f a i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n :  " t h e  h i g h e s t  degree  of 
proportionality should be achieved between the number of inhab- 
itants of a State and the number of its representatives in the 
European Parliament." Together with this basic proportionality 
principle came two more conditions: "all the important political 
forces of a State should be represented in the European Parlia- 
ment", and "the new distribution of seats should not lead to a 
reduction in the present number of any State's representatives." 
In effect these criteria impose a minimum required number of 
representatives for each nation (the second of them alone im- 
plying that the first must be satisfied). These numbers were: 
36 each to the FRG, Italy, U.K., and France, 14 each to the 
Netherlands and Belgium, 10 each to Denmark and Ireland, and 6 
to Luxembourg, for a total of 198. 
The resolution also proposed a specific apportionment of 
359 seats that amply satisfied the minimum requirements, but 
badly failed to meet the criterion of proportionality. Many 
competing proposals were advanced, and a deadlock developed. 
To resolve the deadlock, the French proposed that the s t a t u s  .uuo 
be maintained; simultaneously the Belgians put forward a plan 
that would add to the allocation of 198 seats that then existed 
198 more apportioned according to populations. The final solu- 
tion, based on the suggestion of the FRG to simply double the 
existing distribution, essentially satisfied the status quo 
position while admitting several delicate adjustments. Appar- 
ently, 72 (twice 36) did not suffice for the U.K. to allot seats 
internally among England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: 
the U.K. felt it needed 81. So the big four each got 81. In 
view of the populations, 28 was too much for Belgium and the 
Netherlands, 20 too much for Denmark and Ireland, and 12 too 
much for Luxembourg. 28 became 25; 20 became 15; and 12 became 6. 
But the Danes had instructions not to accept less than 16, and 
the Belgians, for internal reasons, preferred an even number, 
so Belgium ceded one seat to Denmark. 
To students of the history of the United States the problem 
has a familiar ring. A considerable investment of time and thought 
was given to the apportionment of seats among the states at the 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. The dominant 
philosophical ideal of the time was, as James Madison stated it, 
that the states "ought to vote in the same proportion in which 
their citizens would do if the people of all the states were 
collectively met", yet this was checked by the fear of the small 
states "solicitous to guard ... against an improper consolidation" 
of the larger states.* From this emerged a House apportioned 
among the states according to their populations but guaranteeing 
each at least one seat no matter how small, and a Senate with 
each state accorded two seats whatever its size. This concession 
of the larger to the smaller states (known to the students of 
American history as the Great Compromise) was necessary to create 
a federation of previously sovereign states. Very quickly, how- 
ever, elected officials ceased to think of themselves as narrow 
sectional representatives of separate states, formed national 
political parties that transcended state boundaries, and came 
to represent people belonging to one, larger community. 
The same development can be seen in the European Parliament. 
Trans-national parties have formed. Members of Parliament no 
longer vote in national blocs; instead of representing purely 
national interests they represent people  in one larger European 
Community. 
This new situation means, however, that representatives 
ought properly to represent equal numbers of constituents no 
matter in what nation they happen to reside. The present allo- 
cation is grossly distorted from this standpoint. For example, 
one representative of the F.R.G. stands for 759,420 people, where- 
as one representative of recently admitted Greece stands for 
381,958 people: the voice of a Greek in electing a member of 
Parliament is wor th  two t i m e s  that of a German. The large dis- 
crepancies in the representation of people in different nations 
may be seen by comparing their average constituency sizes (see 
Table 1). The more the Community unifies the less will its in- 
habitants be willing to accept such difference~. 
F.R.G. 
Italy 
U.K. 
France 
No. people 
Population Representatives per Repr . 
(000 's) 
Netherlands 13,770 25 550,800 
Belgium 9,818 24 409,083 
Greece 9,167 24 381,958 
Denmark 5,073 16 317,063 
Ireland 3,162 15 210,800 
Luxembourg 356 6 59 , 333 
Table 1. Number of people per representative 
(1 976 populations) 
The ad hoc character of the 1976 solution creates other 
problems. How many seats should be allotted to a new entrant? 
The one case so far is Greece, which received 24 seats--apgar- 
ently because, while it was much smaller than the   ether lands 
and therefore deserved less than 25, it could be reasonably 
bracketed with Belgium and therefore get 24.. Thus does one ad 
hoc solution beget another. And there will almost certainly be 
still more new entrants in the years to come, such as Portugal, 
Spain or Turkey. 
Shifting populations are further eroding the legitimacy of 
the present apportionment. Projections suggest .that between 1976 
and 1985 France's population will have increased by some 2 million 
and Germany's decreased by about the same amount. Such shifts 
should entail periodic reapportionments to maintain a fair bal- 
ance among the voices of the people no matter where they happen 
to reside in the Community. 
In a word, the force of events in the Community increasingly 
supports the logic of representation in the Parliament that is 
proportional to populations, and so to the choice of a formula 
for determining periodic apportionments that guarantee one-man, 
one-vote . 
2. PRINCIPLES 
Ideally, every delegate to the European Parliament should 
represent the same number of constituents. But the ideal cannot 
be met. Allocating seats precisely in proportion to populations 
is impossible because representatives are by nature indivisible: 
they do not come in half- or quarter-sizes. Further the pract- 
ical provision for minimum numbers of representatives, designed 
to protect the interests of the smaller states, forces a modifi- 
cation in the ideal. 
Nevertheless, as stated over a century and a half ago by 
the great American statesman and constitutional lawyer Daniel 
Webster, "that which cannot be done perfectly must be done in a 
manner as near perfection as can be." The objective is to achieve 
the highest degree of proportionality subject to the minimum 
requirements. Our aim is to interpret this objective in terms 
of common-sense principles that the objective implies, and then 
to ask what methods satisfy these principles. 3  
The ideal number of constituents per representative or 
c o n s t i t u e n c y  s i z e  is found by dividing the total population by 
the total number of seats. A state's f a i r  share  or q u o t a  is its 
population divided by the constituency size. The quotas of the 
ten member states of the European Parliament are shown in Table 2. 
As they are not whole numbers they must be rounded in some 
fashion. But how? 
Ordinary rounding, in which fractions below . 5  are dropped 
and those above . 5  are rounded up, does not work because it may 
not result in the required number of seats. In Table 2, for 
example, ordinary rounding would yield 435 seats instead of the 
required 434. Therefore, some state having a fraction greater 
than . 5  must be rounded down. The problem is to decide which one 
it should be. 
I n  1832 Daniel  Webster suggested a p r i n c i p l e  by which t o  
t e s t  what would be  an u n r e a s o n a b l e  s o l u t i o n .  An apport ionment  
can n o t  be  a s  n e a r  t h e  i d e a l  a s  may be,  s a i d  Webster ,  i f  it i s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  t r a n s f e r  a seat between two states and b r i n g  b o t h  
of them n e a r e r  t o  t h e i r  quotas .  For example, i f  Belgium w i t h  
quota  15.911 g o t  o n l y  15 seats and t h e  Nether lands ,  w i th  quo ta  
22.316 g o t  23, t h e n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  one s e a t  from t h e  Nether lands  
t o  Belgium would b r i n g  b o t h  of  them n e a r e r  t o  t h e i r  quo ta s .  
Th i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  c a l l e d  s t a y i n g  n e a r  t h e  q u o t a .  
Country 
F.R.G. 
I t a l y  
France 
Nether lands  
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
I r e l a n d  
Luxembourg 
Popu la t ion  
( 0 0 0 ' s )  
Quota  
(Ideal Cons t i tuency  = 61 7,058) 
T o t a l  267,803 434 
Table  2 .  Quotas  f o r  t h e  European Pa r l i amen t  
4 (1 976 popu la t ions  ) 
A r e l a t e d  and seemingly innocuous c r i t e r i o n  i s  t h a t  no s t a t e  
should g e t  more t han  i t s  quota  rounded up ( i t s  u p p e r  q u o t a )  nor  
l e s s  thpn i t s  quo ta  rounded down ( i t s  lower  q u o t a ) .  Thus t h e  
U . K . ,  wi th  quota  90.567, should  presumably g e t  e i t h e r  90 o r  91 
s e a t s ,  but  no t  89 o r  92. This p r i n c i p l e  i s  c a l l e d  s t a y i n g  w i t h i n  
t h e  q u o t a .  An apportionment may be near t h e  quota without s tay-  
ing wi th in  t h e  quota.  For example, i f  a l l  s t a t e s  i n  Table 2 a r e  
rounded i n  t h e  ord inary  way except f o r  t h e  Netherlands,  which 
i s  given only 21 s e a t s ,  t h e  r e s u l t  i s  an apportionment of 434 
s e a t s  i n  which no t r a n s f e r  can br ing  b o t h  s t a t e s  involved nearer  
t o  t h e i r  quotas.  Staying near t h e  quota i s  considerably l e s s  
demanding than s t ay ing  wi th in  the  quotas .  
When minimum requirements a r e  imposed, a s  i n  t h e  European 
Parl iament ,  t h e  concept of quota must be modified. The reason 
is  evident  from Table 2: i f  Denmark, I r e l a n d ,  and Luxembourg 
go t  t h e i r  minimum requ i renen t s  ( 1 0 ,  1 0 ,  and 6 r e s p e c t i v e l y )  no t  
enough s e a t s  would remain f o r  t h e  o t h e r s  t o  g e t  even t h e i r  lower 
quotas.  (The sum of t h e  lower quotas  of t h e  seven remaining 
na t ions  is  4 1 6 ,  which added t o  t h e  26  requi red  f o r  t h e  smal l e s t  
t h r e e  g ives  a  t o t a l  of 4 4 2 .  ) 
To f i n d  t h e  f a i r  sha res  of t h e  s t a t e s  i n  t h e  presence of 
minimum requirements,  f i r s t  compute t h e  shares  without  requi re-  
ments using t h e  i d e a l  cons t i tuency s i z e ,  then reduce a l l  t h e  
shares  i n  t h e  same propor t ion  by increas ing  t h e  cons t i tuency 
s i z e  u n t i l  t h e  l a r g e r  of t h e  reduced sha res  o r  requireznents, 
summed over a l l  s t a t e s ,  equals  t h e  number of s e a t s  t o  be appor- 
t ioned.  The m o d i f i e d  q u o t a  of a  s t a t e  i s  i t s  reduced share  o r  
requirement,  whichever is  l a r g e r .  Table 3  shows t h e  modified 
quotas f o r  t h e  European Parliament obtained by increas ing  t h e  
cons t i tuency s i z e  from 617,058 t o  635,324. The modified quotas  
of Denmark, I r e l a n d ,  and Luxembourg a r e  t h e  same a s  t h e i r  minimum 
requirements and t h e  sha res  of t h e  remaining s t a t e s  a r e  reduced 
p ropor t iona l ly  so  t h a t  they sum up t o  t h e  remaining 408 s e a t s .  
For s i t u a t i o n s  with minimum requirements,  s t ay ing  wi th in  o r  near  
t h e  quota i s  def ined  r e l a t i v e  t o  these  t r u e  f a i r  shares  o r  
m o d i f i e d  q u o t a s .  
Country Minimum Reduced Share Modified Quota  
F.R.G. 
I t a l y  
U.K.  
France 
Nether lands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
I r e l a n d  
Luxembourg 
T o t a l  21 2 4 3 4  4 3 4  
Table 3 .  Modified Quotas  f o r  t h e  European Par l iament  
(1 976 popu la t ions )  
An important  b u t  more s u b t l e  a s p e c t  of  one-man, one-vote i s  
t h a t  s o l u t i o n s  should harbor  no sys t ema t i c  tendency t o  favor  
c e r t a i n  s t a t e s  o r  groups of s t a t e s  a t  t h e  expense of  o t h e r s .  
Whereas i n  a  s p e c i f i c  problem some s t a t e s  w i l l  n e c e s s a r i l y  g e t  
more than  t h e i r  t r u e  f a i r  sha res  and o t h e r  less (because of  t h e  
need t o  round) ,  over many problems an apportionment method should 
on average  g i v e  each s t a t e ,  l a r g e  and smal l ,  i t s  f a i r  sha re .  
This  i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of  being u n b i a s e d .  
D i f f e r e n t  problems of apportionment have d i f f e r e n t  d a t a  f o r  
popula t ions  change, n a t i o n s  may jo in  o r  secede from t h e  Par l iament  
and t h e  t o t a l  number of s e a t s  t o  be a l l o c a t e d  may vary.  A form- 
u l a  f o r  determining apportionments must g i v e  s o l u t i o n s  t h a t  change 
c o n s i s t e n t l y  wi th  t h e  changes i n  t h e  d a t a .  A s t a t e  whose popula t ion  
is growing should never lose seats to a state whose population 
is d e c l i n i n g .  Incredibly, there is a well-known and much used 
method that does not respect this p o p u l a t i o n  p r i n c i ~ l e .  
New members will undoubtedly be added to the European 
Community and it is conceivable that some members will depart. 
This should not disrupt the existing distribution of seats among 
the remaining states. Specifically, if a state enters (or leaves) 
with the correct number of seats--as determined by its popula- 
tion and the method being used--then the existing allotments 
to the other states should not change. This is the new s t a t e s  
p r i n c i p l e .  There are methods that violate it. 
The total number of seats in a Parliament often undergoes 
changes (usually increases). If more seats are added, the 
membership and populations being fixed, then surely one would 
not expect that a state could l o s e  seats. It would be as per- 
verse to suppose a profit-sharing formula for a firm in which 
some partner's share of the profits decreased  as the total 
profits of the firm i n c r e a s e d .  Nevertheless there is a seeming- 
ly reasonable method in use that violates this s i z e  p r i n c i p l e .  
Armed with these six fundamental principles it is possible 
to examine apportionment formulas to determine which best meet 
the ideal of one-man, one-vote. 
3. METHODS 
The three best known and most used methods of apportionment 
have many aliases in both name and description. We will call 
them by the names of their first inventors and describe them as 
they did. 
Alezander  Barnilton Is method5 (also known as the method of 
largest remainders). Begin by giving to each nation the whole 
number contained in its (modified) quota. The seats left over 
are assigned to those states having the largest fractional re- 
mainders. For the example of Table 4 the first process allots 
430 seats and the remaining 4 are given one each to the F.R.G., 
the U.K., the Netherlands and Belgium. 
With Greece Without Greece 
Population Modified Hamilton Modified Hamilton 
~ i n i m a  (000 's )  Quota Appt . Quota Appt . 
F.R.G. 3 6 61 513 96 .822 97 96.927 97 
I t a l y  3 6 56 168 88.408 8 8 88.505 . 8 9 
U. K. 3 6 55 885 87.963 8 8 88.059 88 
France 3 6 52 891 83.250 8 3 83.341 8 3 
Netherlands 14 13 770 21.674 22 21.698 22 
Belgium 14 9 818 15.454 16 15.470 15 
Greece 14 9 167 14.429 14 - - 
Denmark 10 5 073 10 10 10 10 
I re land 10 3 162 10 10 10 10 
Luxembourg 6 356 6 6 6 6 
Total  267 803 434 434 420 420 
Table 4 .  Hamilton Apportionments w i t h  and wi thout  Greece - 
showing v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  new s t a t e s  p r i n c i p l e  (1976 popula t ions)  
Hamil ton 's  method c l e a r l y  s t a y s  w i t h i n  t h e  quota ,  s i n c e  
each (modified) quota  i s  e i t h e r  rounded up o r  rounded down. I t  
a l s o  s t a y s  near  t h e  quota ,  f o r  even i f  some s t a t e ' s  a l lo tmen t  
under Hamilton w e r e  n o t  a s  c l o s e  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  i t s  quota  (such 
a s  Belgium i n  Table 4 w i t h  quota  15.454 and 16 s e a t s )  t h e  t r a n s -  
f e r  of a s e a t  would p u t  any o t h e r  s t a t e  f u r t h e r  from i t s  quota  
(e.g.  Greece o r  t h e  U . K . )  . 
Hamilton's  method a l s o  has  no b i a s  i n  favor  of l a r g e r  o r  
of sma l l e r  s t a t e s .  Th i s  i s  because t h e  s i z e  of t h e  remainders 
of t h e  modified quotas  t h a t  determine which s t a t e s  g e t  e x t r a  
s e a t s  a r e  independent of t h e  s i z e  of t h e  s t a t e s  themselves.  
Thus, t h e  chance of a smal l  s t a t e  g e t t i n g  an e x t r a  s e a t  i s  t h e  
same a s  f o r  a l a r g e  one. 
But Hamilton's method violates the new states principle. 
The example of Table 4 shows that without Greece Hamilton's 
method applied to the 1976 populations and 420 seats would give 
Italy 89 seats and Belgium 15. But if Greece entered with 14 
seats, bringing the total to the current 434, then Italy would 
receive one less (88) and Belgium one more (1 6) . 
Hamilton's method also violates the population principle. 
Suppose it were discovered that the populations of the F.R.G. 
and the U.K. had both been over-counted by 200,000 persons, 
Italy over-counted by 10,000, and Belgium under-counted by 10,000. 
This gives the populations of Table 5. The apportionment differs 
only in that Italy, a state that loses population, gains o n e  seat, 
whereas Belgium, a state that gains population, loses o n e  seat. 
F.R.G. 
I t a l y  
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
I re land 
Luxembourg 
Population Modified Hamilton 
Minim (000's) Quota Appt . 
Modified Hamilton 
Quota Appt . 
Total  267 403 434 434 1 432 432 
Table 5. Hamilton Apportionments for slightly modified 1976 
populations - showing violation of population and size principles 
The same example shows t h a t  Hamilton's method v i o l a t e s  t h e  
s i z e  p r i n c i p l e .  For when 434 s e a t s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  among t h e  
na t ions  Belgium r e c e i v e s  15 s e a t s ,  whereas i f  only 432 s e a t s  
a r e  t o  be shared Belgium's assignment jumps t o  16. 
These v i o l a t i o n s  of p r i n c i p l e s  come about because Hamilton's 
approach uses  remainders t o  determine t h e  p r i o r i t y  f o r  "ex t ra"  
s e a t s  r a t h e r  than t h e  relative sizes of t h e  s t a t e s .  The re- 
mainders of l a r g e  s t a t e s  change more r a p i d l y  i n  abso lu te  amount 
than those  of small  s t a t e s  when t h e  t o t a l  number of s e a t s  t o  be 
apportioned changes, a s t a t e  i s  added o r  dropped, o r  t h e r e  a r e  
some small  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  populat ion da ta .  
The method of Thomas ~ e f f e r s o n ~  ( a l s o  known a s  d ' l o n d t ' s ,  
Hagenbach-Bischoff's, t h e  method of h i g h e s t  averages and t h e  
method of g r e a t e s t  d i v i s o r s ) .  F i r s t ,  compute t h e  f a i r  sha res  
using t h e  i d e a l  cons t i tuency s i z e .  Then, i n c r e a s e  a l l  t h e  
sha res  i n  t h e  same propor t ion  by reducing t h e  cons t i tuency s i z e  
u n t i l  t h e  whole numbers contained i n  t h e  increased sha res  ( o r  
t h e  minimum requirements ,  whichever is l a r g e r )  summed over a l l  
s t a t e s ,  equals  t h e  t o t a l  number t o  be apportioned. 
Modified J e f f e r s o n  J e f f e r s o n  
F.R.G. 
I t a l y  
U . K .  
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
I re l and  
Luxembourg 
Minima 
3 6 
36 
36 
36 
14 
14 
14 
10 
10 
6 
Quota 
99.688 
91.026 
90.567 
85.715 
22.316 
15.911 
14.856 
8.221 
5.124 
0.572 
Quota number 
96.822 97.693 
88.408 89.204 
87.963 88.755 
83.250 84.000 
21.674 21.869 
15.454 15.593 
14.429 14.559 
10 10 
10 10 
6 6 
apportionment 
To ta l  - 4 3 4  434 - 4 3 4  
Table 6. J e f f e r s o n  apportionment (1976 popula t ions)  
The largest constituency size (or "common divisor") for which 
the correct sum is obtained is called the Jeffzrson divisor (in 
this case 629,654) and the associated shares (or minimum require- 
ments, whichever is larger) are the Jafferson numbers. For 
example, the U.K.'s Jefferson number is 88.755 so it receives 
88 seats and France's is 84.0001 so it is assigned 84. 
Jefferson's method assures each state at least its lower 
quota, because the Jefferson numbers used to determine the ap- 
portionment are larger than the modified quotas. However, 
Jefferson's method may not stay near the quota. In the example 
of Table 6 taking one seat from France and transferring it to 
the Netherlands would bring both closer to their modified quotas. 
Moreover, although this example does not show it, the method can 
give to large states more seats than its upper quota, so it does 
not necessarily stay within the quota. For example, according 
to the 1980 United States Census California's modified quota is 
45.653, but Jefferson's method would assign it 48 seats. 
Jefferson's method is strongly biased in favor of the 
larger states. This can be observed in practice: for example, 
France receiving 84 seats when it deserves only 83.250 and the 
Netherlands 21 when it deserves 21.674 (and California 48 when 
it deserves 45.653). This happens systematically because the 
Jefferson numbers of the larger states differ from the modified 
quotas by larger absolute amounts than those of the smaller 
states. For example, in Table 6 the F.R.G.'s Jefferson number 
is 0.871 larger than its modified quota, while Greece's is only 
0.170 larger. So the chance that a state receives more seats 
than its lower quota is much greater for the big states than 
for the small. 
On the other hand, the method of Jefferson satisfies the 
new states, population, and size principles. If a state and the 
number of seats it deserves is dropped (or vice versa) then the 
identical Jefferson numbers give the solution for the states 
that remain. If between two apportionments some states popula- 
tion decreases but its representation increases, then its 
Jefferson number must also have increased; hence any state whose 
populat ion inc reases  cannot have a smal ler  J e f f e r s o n  number 
and so it cannot have received fewer s e a t s .  F i n a l l y ,  i f  more 
s e a t s  a r e  t o  be a l l o c a t e d  then t h e  J e f f e r s o n  numbers t h a t  change 
a l l  i nc rease ,  s o  no s t a t e  can poss ib ly  l o s e  a s e a t .  
7 Daniel Webs t e r ' s  method ( a l s o  known a s  Saint-Lagfie's, t h e  
method of odd numbers, and t h e  method of major f r a c t i o n s ) .  F i r s t  
compute t h e  f a i r  sha res  of each s t a t e  using t h e  i d e a l  c o n s t i t u -  
ency s i z e .  Then change a l l  t h e  shares  i n  t h e  same propor t ion  by 
a l t e r i n g  t h e  cons t i tuency s i z e  u n t i l  t h e  whole numbers c l o s e s t  
t o  t h e  a l t e r e d  sha res  ( o r  t h e  minimum requirements ,  whichever 
is  l a r g e r )  summed over  a l l  s t a t e s ,  equals  t h e  t o t a l  number t o  
be apportioned. 
F.R.G. 
I t a l y  
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
I re l and  
Luxembourg 
To ta l  
Minimum 
3 6 
36 
36 
36 
14 
14 
14 
10 
10 
6 
Quota 
99.688 
91.026 
90.567 
85.715 
22.316 
15.911 
14.856 
8.221 
5.124 
0.577 
Modified 
Quota 
96.822 
88.408 
87.963 
83.250 
21.674 
15.454 
14.429 
10 
10 
6 
Webster 
number 
96.922 
88.500 
88.054 
83.337 
21.696 
15.470 
14.444 
10 
10 
6 
J e f f e r s o n  
number 
Table 7. Webster apportionment (1976 popula t ions)  
The largest constituency size (or "common divisor") for which 
the correct sum is obtained is called the Webster  d i v i s o r  (in 
this case 634 666) and the associated shares (or minimum require- 
ments, whichever is larger) are the Webster  numbers .  For example, 
Italy's Webster number is 88.5001 so it receives 89, Belgium's 
14.470 so it receives 14. Sometimes the Webster numbers are 
greater than the modified quotas, sometimes smaller (e.g., for 
the apportionment of 434 seats of Table 5 they are smaller). 
Webster's method does not invariably stay within the quota: 
it is mathematically possible for a state either to receive more 
seats than its upper quota or less than its lower quota. But 
in practice the likelihood of this happening is nil. Computer 
simulations done on United States apportionments revealed that 
Webster's method would have violated quota less than one appor- 
tionment in a thousand. However, Webster's method always stays 
near the quota for essentially the same reason that Hamilton's 
does. It is also unbiased because the Webster numbers have the 
same chance of being greater than the modified quotas as being 
smaller and the chance that a state has a remainder above or 
below .5 is the same regardless of its size. Finally, Webster's 
method satisfies the population, new states and size principles 
for exactly the same reasons (applied to Webster numbers) as 
does Jefferson's. 
The case is summarized in Table 7. Not one of the three 
methods meets all principles. Is there one that does? The 
answer is no; there is no perfect method. It is mathematically 
impossible to have a method that always stays within the quota 
and satisfies the population principle. However, Webster's 
"almost" always stays within the quota. It is also the one and 
only method that absolutely satisfies all principles except 
staying within the quota. 
Methods 
Principles Hamilton Jefferson Webster 
stay within quota Yes No No 
stay near quota Yes 
unbiased Yes 
No Yes 
No Yes 
population No Yes Yes 
new states No Yes Yes 
size No Yes Yes 
Table 7. Methods meeting principles 
Jefferson's is the one and only method that satisfies the 
population, new states and size principles and always assures 
each state its lower quota. However, it is very biased in favor 
of the larger states and frequently gives large states seats 
in excess of their upper quotas. 
Hamilton's method is unbiased and always stays within the 
quota, but frequently violates the population, new states, and 
size principles. 
The conclusion seems inescapable that Webster's method 
comes closest to meeting the principles of one-man, one-vote. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
The historical evolution of representation in federal 
systems and the theory developed in the preceding sections lead 
to certain conclusions and recommendations concerning the future 
allocation of seats in the European Parliament. The formation 
of parties across national boundaries will inevitably lead to 
greater integration and pressure for representation in proportion 
to populations. Sooner or later, as populations shift and new 
states enter the European Community, the existing allocation 
will lose any justification it may once have had. 
What a r e  t h e  requirements  f o r  a  s o l u t i o n  wi th  more enduring 
leg i t imacy?  
F i r s t ,  some p rov i s ion  must be made f o r  a  p e r i o d i c  census of 
popula t ions ,  f o r  example every 5  o r  1 0  yea r s .  Only thus  can 
growing and changing popula t ions  be r e f l e c t e d  promptly and f a i r l y  
by changes i n  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  numbers on which re -  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  based must be made c o n s i s t e n t  f o r  a l l  member 
s t a t e s .  Whether t h e  b a s i s  should be t h e  number of v o t e r s  o r  t h e  
number of i n h a b i t a n t s ,  o r  should inc lude  overseas  c i t i z e n s ,  non- 
c i t i z e n s ,  i l l e g a l  immigrants, o r  p r i s o n e r s  i s  a  m a t t e r  f o r  t h e  
l e g i s l a t o r s  t o  dec ide .  
Second, some d e f i n i t e  m e t h o d  of apportionment must be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  by law t o  prevent  t h e  i n e v i t a b l e  scramble f o r  s e a t s  
t h a t  would o therwise  r e s u l t  a f t e r  each census.  The choice i n  
terms of s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  most p r i n c i p l e s  of  f a i r n e s s  i s  Webster 's  
method. 
Third,  t h e r e  must be a  d e f i n i t e  and e q u i t a b l e  procedure f o r  
a s s ign ing  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  new s t a t e s .  One approach is  t o  de- 
termine t h e  number of s e a t s  t h e  e n t e r i n g  s t a t e  would deserve  
based on t h e  e s t i m a t e  of i t s  popula t ion  a t  t h e  prev ious  census 
d a t e .  The p r e c i s e  number ass igned would depend of course  on t h e  
method being used. Under Webster ' s  method t h e  l a r g e s t  common 
d i v i s o r  used t o  f i n d  t h e  previous apportionment would be app l i ed  
t o  t h e  new s t a t e  a s  w e l l .  For example, i f  Po r tuga l  were t o  e n t e r  
t h e  Community, then  i t s  1 9 7 6  popula t ion  of 9,664,000 would be 
d iv ided  by t h e  1976 Webster d i v i s o r  of 634 6 6 6 ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  a  
Webster number of 15.227 and so an a l l o c a t i o n  of 15 s e a t s  and t h e  
o t h e r  d e l e g a t i o n s  would s t a y  t h e  same, s i n c e  Webster ' s  method 
s a t i s f i e s  t h e  new s t a t e s  p r i n c i p l e .  
Fourth ,  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of t h e  s m a l l e s t  s t a t e s ,  
e q u i t a b l e  minima must be f i x e d  i n  advance. The p r e s e n t  minima 
o r i g i n a t e d  i n  making s u r e  t h a t  a l l  t h e  major f o r c e s  of a  s t a t e  
would be represented .  For Luxembourg t h i s  o r i g i n a l l y  meant a  
minimum of 3 r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  but  was l a t e r  doubled t o  6 .  The 
r e s u l t  is t h a t  t h e  average c i t i z e n  of Luxembourg has  1 2  times 
more r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  than  does a  c i t i z e n  of t h e  FRG. While t h e  
choice of minima is ultimately up to the members of the European 
Community simple equity and common sense suggest that they should 
be reduced--perhaps to one-half their present values, or per- 
haps to a uniform minimum of 1  per state. 
It is essential, however, that the minima be fixed. A 
politically tempting alternative is to legislate that no state 
can ever lose seats in a redistribution. This can yield one of 
two results, both deleterious: either the total number of seats 
increases without limit, resulting in a hopelessly unwieldy body; 
or if the number of seats is fixed but no state can lose, then 
as populations shift proportional representation eventually cease 
to exist. 
If Webster's method were adopted and Portugal admitted on 
the basis of its 1976  population, Portugal would receive 15 seats 
and the Parliament would grow to 449 seats. Reapportionments 
based on projected 1985  populations under three different hypo- 
theses of fixed minima--a uniform guarantee of 1  seat to each 
state, the "old" minima, and the "old" divided by 2 --are given 
by way of illustr.ation in Table 8. 
Population Mod.Quota Webster Mod-Quota Webster Mod.Quota Webster 
(000's)  (Min 1) Appt. (Min old+2) Appt. (Min old) Appt. 
F.R.G. 
I ta ly  
U.K. 
France 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Greece 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
Total 280 541 44 9 449 44 9 44 9 44 9 449 
Table 8. Webster apportionments projected 8  populations ) 
The European Parliament is only one of three policy making 
institutions of the Community, along with the Council of Minis- 
ters and the Commission. Its explicit powers are not extensive, 
although its potential influence may be great. In the words of 
one authority, "Its task is primarily that of providing a demo- 
cratic input into the Community decision making process and 
a 
providing an on-going forum for debate on Community matters."> 
To consecrate its democratic character and to assure a fair re- 
presentation of all the people of the Community, apportionment 
legislation incorporating Webster's method appears to be needed. 
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